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Comprehensive federal agricultural legislation occurs in the United States on a five-year
schedule.  While year-to-year changes in agricultural policy do occur, the period 1991-93 has
been less eventful than many previous ones.  What changes have occurred to affect the course of
the agricultural sector and agricultural policy are largely external to the farm bill and farm
legislation.  These include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), tentatively
agreed in August 1992; the on-going negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the related dispute with the European Community (EC) over oilseed subsidies; the
emergence in connection with both NAFTA and GATT of the "trade and environment" issue; a
continuing dispute over wetlands and the proper level of compensation if they are restricted by
government action; and, of course, the presidential election of 1992 and the probable changes in
course under a new Clinton administration.
This review article will begin with a brief summary of federal legislative actions impinging
on agriculture; however, the general analysis and tabular summary provided in our 1990 review
(Erdman and Runge, 1990) will still suffice as a guide to extant farm policy under the 1990 farm
bill.  The second section will consider the probable impacts of NAFTA.  The third will discuss the
state of play in the GATT negotiations and the related oilseeds dispute with the EC.  The fourth
will briefly discuss the "trade and environment" issue.  The fifth will discuss domestic U.S.
environmental issues, focusing on wetlands.  The final section will offer an outlook on the course
of the Clinton administration in the years leading to the 1995 farm bill.     
1These new laws can be found indexed under "agriculture" in the computer database LEGI-
SLATE, which can be accessed on most computer systems in the U.S.
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1.  A Legislative Review
Despite the assertion that legislation affecting farm policy during 1991-93 has been
relatively uneventful, the U.S. Congress successfully passed almost 100 pieces of law related to
agriculture.
1  To read through this list is to comprehend the manner in which the Lilliputian
members of Congress concoct strands of legislation each of which influences policy very little, but
the sum of which contributes to "gridlock" and continuing budget deficits.  Among the more
diverting entries in the list was designation on October 23, 1992, of American Wine Appreciation
Week (Public Law 102-468, introduced as House Resolution 489 by Representative Fazio of
California) and Congressional support for the planting of 500 California Redwood Trees in Spain
in honor of the quincentennial of Columbus' discovery of the New World (Public Law 102-472,
also approved October 23, 1992 as House Resolution 529).
Apart from these sorts of activity (which in fact cost little or nothing but time) the primary
legislative actions bearing on agriculture either involved specific issues such as trade or
environmental policy, or the mother's milk of Congressional politics:  appropriation bills providing
flows of funds for actions previously authorized under the 1990 farm bill.  With a projected 1997
federal deficit of $305 billion, assuming a full spending freeze, the appropriations process grows
in importance.  The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-142, approved October 28, 1991), for
example, illustrates the extraordinary influence of the former Appropriations Committee chairman,
Representative Jamie L. Whitten, Democrat of Mississippi, for whom agriculture is a special3
interest and from whose committee the legislation has emanated until 1992, when he was replaced
by Representative William H. Natcher, Democrat of Kentucky.  Among other things, this bill
appropriated funds for fiscal year 1992 for the following programs and services:
(1) Office of the Secretary of Agriculture; (2) Office of the Deputy Secretary of
Agriculture; (3) Office of Budget and Program Analysis; (4) Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Administration; (5) Departmental Administration; (6) Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; (7) Office of Public Affairs; (8)
Office of the Inspector General; (9) Office of the General Counsel; (10) Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Economics; (11) Economic Research Service; (12) National
Agricultural Statistics Service; (13) World Agricultural Outlook Board; (14) Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Science and Education; (15) Agricultural Research
Service; (16) Cooperative State Research Service; (17) Extension Service; (18)
National Agricultural Library; (19) Office of the Assistant Secretary for Marketing
and Inspection Services; (20) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; (21) Food
Safety and Inspection Service; (22) Federal Grain Inspection Service; (23)
Agricultural Cooperative Service; (24) Agricultural Marketing Service; (25) Packers
and Stockyards Administration; (26) Office of the Under Secretary for International
Affairs and Commodity Programs; (27) Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Service; (28) Federal Crop Insurance Corporation; and (29) Commodity Credit
Corporation Fund.
Given this list, it is easy to see why bureaucrats everywhere, from the Secretary of
Agriculture to the lowliest government servant, have lived in fear of the Appropriations
Committee.  Although appropriations bills ostensibly only grant funds to various programs,
certain "limits and prohibition" can have considerable effect.  In the case of the 1992 bill, for
example, funds for the Wetlands Reserve Program, heralded as a major environmental
achievement of the 1990 farm bill, were limited to "not more than 50,000 acres" for fiscal year
1992.  At the same time, appropriations bills can do very specific things for individual members of
Congress, and to various programs.  The same 1992 appropriations bill, for example, prohibited
the relocation of the Hawaii State Office of the Farmers Home Administration from Hilo, Hawaii     
2For a discussion of "base" acreage, see Cochrane and Runge, 1992, Chapter 3.
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to Honolulu, and made available until expended obligations for the Grasshopper and Morman
Cricket Control Programs.  In the year following, the 1993 agricultural appropriations act (Public
Law 102-341, approved August 14, 1992) prohibited altogether the use of funds made available
under the act "to enroll additional Wetlands Reserve Program or Conservation Reserve Program
acres," effectively bringing these two environmental measures to a standstill.
In addition to appropriations bills, farm bills are typically amended and updated annually. 
The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act Amendments of 1991 (Public Law 102-237,
approved December 13, 1991), for example, emanated from the House Committee on
Agriculture, bearing the name of its venerable chairman, Representative E. ("Kika") de la Garza,
Democrat of Texas.  These annual amendments typically fine-tune the reigning farm bill.  The
1991 amendments, for example, permitted double-cropping of soybeans on certain acres, but
prohibited price support loans for these soybeans, and required the combining of corn and grain
sorghum bases for each of 1992 through 1995.
2  Again, such amendments can be of especial
importance to certain members of Congress.  The 1991 amendments, for example, required that
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds be used if necessary to cross-subsidize the Farms for
the Future Act of 1990 "if sufficient funds are not otherwise available to carry out such program
in Vermont."  The reason this small state was singled out was probably not unrelated to the fact
that the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry is chaired by Senator Patrick Leahy,
Democrat of Vermont.
Outside of appropriations and annual amendments to the farm bill, a variety of interesting
but highly specific agricultural measures passed the Congress during this period, too numerous to5
catalogue fully here.  The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-555,
approved October 23, 1992), for example, was introduced as H.R. 6133 to conform to a similar
bill that had passed the Senate as H.R. 3614.  The bill establishes a new national land remote
sensing policy with the aim of enabling the U.S. to maintain its leadership in the use of satellite
remote sensing technology.  This technology is increasingly useful as a targeting method for
environmentally vulnerable land areas.  In the health area, the Pacific Yew Act (Public Law 102-
335) was introduced by Representative Gerry E. Studds, Democrat of Massachusetts, and was
approved August 7, 1992.  The act directs the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to revise
the management of public lands under their authority (amounting to about one-third of the U.S.)
to protect the Pacific yew tree, which has recently been found to contain a potent anti-cancer
agent, taxol.
As these examples make clear, while eventful shifts in agricultural policy did not occur
during 1991-93, the legislative beat went on, driven less by notions of policy reform than politics. 
It is therefore constructive to consider several notable discussions of agriculture in the political
arena.
2.  North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
NAFTA was a key priority for the Bush administration, reflecting the two-pronged
negotiating strategy of the United States in international trade.  While moving forward as well as
possible at the multilateral level in GATT, the U.S. has tried to expand its regional trading
dominance through NAFTA, in part as insurance in the event that GATT failed and in part as a     
3An excellent recent review, from which this analysis is partly drawn, is Williams and Rossen
(1992).
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threat (aimed especially at the European Community) designed to force progress at the
multilateral level.  If the draft agreement tentatively approved in August 1992 becomes law in the
U.S., Canada and Mexico, it will form the world's largest open trade area, composed of 360
million people, recently producing $6.2 trillion of goods and services and trading more than $1
trillion worth of goods as exports and imports.
3  In agriculture, Mexico is already a major trading
partner of the U.S. (see Figure 1), the third largest market for U.S. agricultural exports ($2.9
billion in 1991), and second only to Japan as a market for meat and meat products.  Imports from
Mexico to the U.S. make it second to Canada as a food supplier, especially of fruits, vegetables,
live cattle, orange juice, and coffee.  In contrast, bilateral agricultural trade between Mexico and
Canada is relatively small, totalling only $100 million in 1990, equal to one percent of Canadian
agricultural exports and only two percent of Canadian imports.
The implementation of NAFTA requires that, after notifying Congress on December 17,
1992, 90 calendar days be set aside for consideration by the House Ways and Means Committee




$2,884 Million in 1991
US Agricultural Imports
from Mexico
$2,536 Million in 1991
Source: Williams and Rosson, 1992, p. 17.7
Senate Finance Committee (to be chaired by Daniel Patrick Maynihan, Democrat of New York,
when its current chairman, Lloyd Benston of Texas, joins the Clinton cabinet as Treasury
Secretary).  During this period, public hearings and legislative debate will occur, as provided for
under so-called "fast track" implementing authority.  A final agreement must be signed by June 1,
1993, to be followed by implementing legislation, which will then have a total of 90 days of
Congressional session (Congress is typically in session about three days per calendar week) to be
considered before a final, up or down vote.  The earliest a final NAFTA agreement could become
effective is thus early 1994.  As noted below, there are also likely to be "side-agreements"
required by the Clinton White House on environmental and possibly labor standards, further
extending the process of final approval and implementation.
Once in place, the agreement calls for reductions in trade barriers according to three
different schedules of 5, 10 and 15 years, with the most sensitive products facing the longest
phase-in schedules.  The impacts on agriculture, according to a recent analysis (Williams and
Rosson, 1992), are likely to favor continued expansion of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico of
feedgrains, wheat, oilseeds, meats, dairy products, selected fruits and vegetables, cotton, tobacco
and processed food products.  From the Mexican side, labor intensive fruit and vegetable
production such as melons would be advantaged, as well as horticultural products subject to high
current tariffs, such as asparagus, tomatoes, lettuce, bell peppers, cucumbers, green chilies,
squash, avocadoes, grapes, guavas and mangoes.
Two areas of particular sensitivity for the U.S. are the border-protected sugar and dairy
industries, both of which have generally looked askance at trade liberalization, especially under8
GATT.  The NAFTA would reduce border protection for U.S. sugar, raising fears that Mexico
could become a net exporter, although Mexico has exported raw sugar to the U.S. in only one of
the last three years.  In the dairy sector, the prospects for the U.S. are actually quite positive,
since Mexico has and will continue to reduce import barriers, creating new markets especially for
milk powder and filled cheeses.  As Mexican incomes increase, demand shifts toward fluid milk,
ice cream and higher quality cheeses can also be expected.
3.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
The confluence of the long-running GATT negotiations and the dispute over oilseeds with
the European Community (EC) occurred dramatically on November 5, 1992, with the U.S.
announcement that punitive tariffs (200 percent) would be imposed on EC white wine imports to
the U.S. on December 5 unless a satisfactory resolution to the dispute could be found.  While
technically separate from the larger GATT discussions, the oilseeds dispute was in fact the issue
that eventually broke European solidarity with the intransigent French, hopefully clearing a path
to a final GATT agreement.  The oilseed dispute itself dated to 1987, when the U.S. first brought
before the GATT a request for a panel to hear complaints that the EC subsidies constituted an
unfair trade practice.  Two GATT panels subsequently ruled in favor of the U.S. position, but the
EC failed to accept the rulings, vetoing the second in GATT in late 1992.
The oilseeds question was tied to the GATT agricultural negotiations because of its
connection to EC demands for "rebalancing" of its border measures in grains and oilseeds.  Since
the Dillon Round agreement to impose the "zero-duty binding" on oilseeds and nongrain feed
ingredients (NGFIs), the EC has increasingly argued that such a gap in its wall of protection9
should be closed.  In return for "closing the CAP" (Common Agricultural Policy) by imposing
variable levies on oilseeds and NGFIs, EC negotiators have offered to lower levels of protection
in the grains:  hence "rebalancing."  This offer has been spurned by the U.S., because the zero
duty binding creates a substantial market for U.S. oilseed producers, as well as NGFIs such as
corn gluten feed, a major by-product of corn milling.  Having failed to achieve "rebalancing," the
EC has nonetheless continually raised levels of internal support to growers of competitive oilseeds
such as rapeseed and sunflowers, thus crowding out U.S. imports of soybeans and NGFIs.  It was
this tactic of internal subvention (which had the intended by-product of creating a growing
internal constituency in the EC for "rebalancing" at the border), about which the U.S. complained
in GATT.
When the EC failed to comply with the two GATT panel rulings, the U.S. was ultimately
driven in November 1992, the day following the U.S. election, to announce punitive 200 percent
tariffs on EC imports to the U.S. of white wine, leading the French to request the EC for a list of
products for counter-retaliation which would no doubt have included oilseeds and NGFIs. 
However, after a series of near-breakdowns in talks, including the resignation and then rejoining
of Ray MacSharry as chief EC agricultural negotiator (MacSharry apparently objected to being
undercut by Jacques Delors and, by implication, the French), a settlement was reached which was
widely interpreted as clearing the way for a larger GATT agreement not only in agriculture, but in
all fifteen negotiating areas of the Uruguay Round.  At this writing, however, the French continue
to maintain that they might veto such a total agreement which under the Luxembourg
Compromise of the Treaty of Rome requires the unanimity of all twelve EC member states (see
Runge and von Witzke, 1987).  If they were to do so, the stage would again be set for a trade-
war.     
4See Erdman and Runge (1992).  This section draws on material forthcoming from the Study
Group on Trade and Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, which the
first author helped to organize.
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4.  Trade and Environment Conflicts
A primary obstacle to NAFTA as well as a prospective GATT deal in Congress is
opposition to trade liberalization from parts of the environmental movement.  In the case of
NAFTA, this opposition will probably lead to a "side agreement" or environmental protocol
providing for a variety of environmental safeguards.  But the issue is much larger, and is likely to
affect future trade relations between the U.S. and rest of the world for the foreseeable future.
4
Three main issues dominate the debate.  The first and most politically salient issue is the
concern that trade liberalization, whether in NAFTA or under GATT, will lead to increased levels
of environmental damages.  There are at least three different aspects of this concern, which has
been expressed strongly by a variety of environmental groups and members of Congress.  At the
most basic level, many of these environmental concerns derive from the "scale effects" of freer
trade.  Scale effects are the result of increases in the quantity of goods and services moving within
countries and across borders (see Runge, 1992).  To the extent that increases in trade following
liberalization lead to greater transportation needs, higher levels of manufacturing output, and
general increases in the demand for raw and processed products, they can also impose greater
"wear and tear" on natural ecosystems.  Among these possible effects are increasing consumption
of non-renewable natural resources including fossil fuels, minerals, and old-growth forests, and
increasing levels of air and water pollution.  A particularly striking example of these impacts often
cited by environmental groups is the pollution found in the rapidly growing "maquiladora" sector
of Mexico.  It has also been suggested that differences in environmental standards, especially11
between North and South, will create "pollution havens" for firms and industries seeking less
regulatory oversight.  Finally, the proposed harmonization of environmental standards is argued to
lead to a "lowest common denominator," in which higher levels of environmental protection are
sacrificed in the name of competitiveness.
In contrast to the environmental community's concern over the impacts of more liberal
trade, those most directly involved in trade have tended to focus on a second main issue, the
potential for protectionism disguised as environmental protection.  This can occur when a country
or trading bloc protects internal markets in the name of environmental health or safety, such as the
European Community's decision to ban the import of beef from cattle treated with certain growth
hormones.  It can also occur when higher levels of environmental standards are used to bar
market access to goods and services produced under lower levels of regulation, especially by
developing countries.  The fundamental issue concerns the ability to distinguish legitimate
environmental measures, which may well distort trade, from those which are not only trade
distorting but have little basis from an environmental standpoint.  Developing such criteria
involves complex legal, scientific and institutional issues.
The third issue involves the relationship between trade agreements and environmental
agreements.  In the last decade, a variety of new multilateral agreements have been negotiated in
response to global environmental challenges such as ozone depletion, species extinction,
protection of Antarctica, and international management of the oceans.  The Rio Conference on
Environment and Development, held in June 1992, resulted in a broad new mandate for
environmental action, Agenda 21, together with the creation of a new U.N. Commission on
Sustainable Development.12
Some of these agreements call on their signatories to refrain from trade in certain goods or
processes.  In the recently completed NAFTA negotiations, for example, a tri-national
commission on environment was created with dispute settlement authority over trade with
damaging environmental effects.  This Commission apparently has authority independent of
GATT law, and the existing GATT dispute resolution process.  The question is:  how are
international environmental accords to be balanced with existing or new trade obligations under
GATT?  What body of international law, and which international institutions, should exercise
authority over the intersection between multilateral environmental and trade policy?
Where different groups stand on these issues depends, as usual, on where their loyalties lie. 
Some environmental and consumer groups have been highly vocal critics of more open trade
under both NAFTA and GATT.  Other environmental groups have taken a cautious but less
openly critical approach.  Overall, the environmental community generally sees risks in more open
trade, while the trade community sees threats to economic growth and integration if
environmental regulations are not harmonized, since these regulations can provide good cover for
protectionism cloaked in a "green" disguise.  Trade negotiators and environmentalists also share
concerns over how global environmental and trade agreements are to be linked, whether one or
the other should take precedence, and the methods by which conflicts should be resolved.
The increasingly competitive and often acrimonious trade relations between the United
States, the European Community, and Japan, are one axis along which trade and environmental
issues arise.  In some respects, the high income countries of the North are increasingly alike in
placing relatively high value on environmental quality.  But these economies are also locked in a13
high stakes game of competition for global markets and their governments face domestic
pressures to loosen regulatory oversight.  Even given their similarities, differences exist in the
North not only in scientific and environmental standards, but in culture and social norms, which
will continually confront attempts to harmonize environmental regulations.  Challenges to these
regulations as nontariff trade barriers, both within regional trading blocs such as NAFTA, and
between nations such as the U.S. and European Community, are likely to be recurrent themes.
The gap between the environmental regulations along the North/South axis is even wider,
accentuating problems of harmonization and concerns over "pollution havens" and
competitiveness.  The NAFTA negotiations reflect these differences in microcosm, with Mexico
attempting rapidly to upgrade its environmental regulations in order to satisfy fears in the U.S.
and Canada.  From the perspective of the North, these fears include lower costs of environmental
compliance by competitors in the South; movement of firms and industries into these low-
regulation areas; the import of goods (such as fruits and vegetables) tainted by treatments banned
in the North for environmental reasons; and the use of production methods in the South (such as
tuna fishing with nets that also kill dolphins) objectionable to environmental interests.  Yet from
the perspective of many in the South, the environmental regulations adopted in the North, even if
desirable, may be unaffordable.  In addition, many developing countries suspect the North of
using its higher standards to discriminate against products and processes primarily for trade rather
than environmental reasons.14
5.  Domestic Environmental Disputes:  Wetlands
As noted briefly above, legislation affecting wetlands was particularly controversial during
1991-93.  The wetlands question was part of a continuing debate over regulation and the
environment being fought out in the courts, Congress, and within the executive branch.  Until the
defeat of the Bush-Quayle administration in November 1992, Vice-President Quayle was
particularly active in opposing a variety of environmental regulations in the name of U.S.
competitiveness.  In the farm sector, these efforts were met with support, especially from the
conservative membership of the National Farm Bureau Federation, and others who posed the
wetlands issue as one of "big government" versus "private property."
The 1990 farm bill had established a Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), designed to
accompany and complement the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) established under the
1985 farm bill.  The 1990 act called on the Secretary of Agriculture to enroll up to one million
wetland acres during 1991-95, at a rate of 200,000 acres per year, by soliciting compensation bids
from landowners.  Preference was to be given to farmed or converted wetlands (if converted prior
to December 23, 1985) and lands alongside the wetlands as well as riparian areas that linked
wetlands eligible for enrollment.  Rather than the 10-year contracts that had characterized the
CRP, the WRP emphasized permanent or long-term (30 year) easement contracts.  Participants
would receive annual payments depending on the bid/acceptance price, technical assistance and
financial cost-sharing of 50-75 percent, with a total payment not to exceed $50,000 per person.
Response by many landowners to the program was enthusiastic, but the implementation was
immediately bogged down in an ostensibly technical debate over how wet a parcel of land must be
to fulfill the legal definition of a wetland (Robbins, 1990; Environmental Defense Fund/World     
5Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, ____ U.S. ____ , 112 S. ct. 2886, 2892 (1992).
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Wildlife Fund, 1992).  As in many environmental disputes, the technical debate was enmeshed in a
philosophical argument over the government's right to interfere with actions of private property
owners.  As noted above, in October 1991, the Appropriations Committee of the House reduced
the legal limit on enrollment to 50,000 acres in only five of fifty states.  And by November of
1991, the White House, led by Vice-President Quayle, had proposed revisions in the technical
definition of a wetland which would have reduced the total of 106 million acres potentially eligible
by half (Weisskopf, 1991).
At the same time that these Congressional and administration struggles over wetlands were
taking place, the Supreme Court and numerous federal courts were hearing cases in which
wetlands regulations were being challenged as examples of "takings."  The takings challenge to
environmental regulation is grounded in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
states in part that:  "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken without just compensation."  This language has
been used to argue that federal, state, or local regulations of wetlands may amount to a taking of
private property, necessitating compensation.  While compensation is provided for under the
Wetlands Reserve Program, some regulations of wetlands do not offer compensation, and
questions may be raised whether the compensation envisioned under the WRP is sufficient.
These issues were considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1992 in a wetlands case widely
watched by the environmental community, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.
5  A 1988
South Carolina statute prevented Lucas, who had invested in 1986 in beach-front property, from
building on it because of its proximity to the sea shore.  Lucas argued that it had lost all of its16
economic value, and that the action interfered with his reasonable investment-backed
expectations, entitling him to compensation.  Weighed against these private claims were the public
interests represented by the South Carolina Coastal Council, including the role of undeveloped
beach-front as a storm barrier, as habitat for plants and animals, and as protection from erosion
and harm to property (see Berlin, forthcoming).
On appeal from the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which had denied Lucas' claim for
compensation, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote five separate opinions in the case.  Five Justices
voted to remand the case to the South Carolina courts for further review, in an opinion written by
Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Thomas).  Justice Kennedy
concurred in a separate decision.  Justices Blackman and Stevens dissented vigorously, while
Justice Souter dissented on the technical grounds that the case was not yet ready for decision.
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lucas was largely based on the argument that a takings
occurs when a regulation "deprives the property of all value where the deprivation is contrary to
reasonable investment-backed expectations."  These expectations, Kennedy claimed somewhat
heroically, are "based on objective rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all
parties involved," and through a review of the "whole of our legal tradition."  By supporting
regulatory actions "without a determination that they were in accord with the owner's reasonable
expectations and therefore sufficient to support a severe restriction on specific parcels of
property," Kennedy argued that the Supreme Court of South Carolina had erred.  In addition, the
fact that other investors had been allowed to build (prior to the regulation) left Lucas to bear an
undue burden.
While the Lucas decision in fact decided little, it raised the level of anxiety in environmental17
circles several notches, since expectations of widespread compensation awards for environmental
regulations, decided by Reagan-Bush appointees to the federal courts, could have a chilling effect
on environmental legislation and reform generally.  In the summer of 1992, these anxieties were
reinforced by a decision in the House Appropriations Committee, also noted above, to totally
eliminate funding for the WRP in fiscal 1993, and to freeze enrollment in the CRP.
6.  The Presidential Election
Despite these apparent set-backs to the environmental agenda, the most overriding event in
terms of future policy during 1991-92 was driven by American anxieties over not only the
environment, but about the economy and quality of life.  The election in November 1992 of
William Clinton and Albert Gore as President and Vice-President of the United States, signalled a
rebuke of the anti-regulatory agenda of Bush-Quayle.  Vice-President Gore, in particular, was
identified with environmental activism, having authored a best-selling book on the subject (Gore,
1992).  President Clinton is likely to be a similar activist across a wide range of major issues.
The particular focus of the Clinton-Gore administration in agriculture is now difficult to
discern, although the appointment of Mike Espy (Democrat from Mississippi) as the new
Secretary of Agriculture suggests an emphasis on rural development, small farmers, and the
"Southern" commodities:  peanuts, cotton, tobacco and rice.  Agricultural policy figured little in
the campaign:  the votes were simply not there, and the risk of a misstep was ever-present. 
Broadly speaking, a special focus on the commodity programs, and their possible reform, is likely
to be a second order of business for the new administration, preceded in importance by fiscal
policy initiatives to reduce the deficit and stimulate growth, the related issue of burgeoning health18
care costs, a possible new national service corps, and a national strategy for energy conservation. 
In foreign affairs, the crises in Somalia and former Yugoslavia, together with chronic instability in
the former Soviet Union, are likely to combine to push agriculture down the list of priorities.
Even so, several factors are likely to define the emphasis of the new administration.  First is
the continuing and conflicting pressure to reduce spending on "entitlements," including
commodity programs, while increasing the quantity and quality of rural infrastructure, including
health care, education, child care, roads and bridges and public recreation facilities.  The result is
likely to be a broader, rural employment focus in farm policy.  Second is the success of NAFTA
and a GATT accord, which if accomplished will impel slow but steady moves toward less
restrictive border measures in agriculture, and lower levels of support based on direct income
grants rather than commodity programs.  If such "decoupled" payments become more acceptable,
part of the reason will be because they are "recoupled" to environmental objectives.  The third
factor driving future agricultural policy, both domestically and in trade, will continue to be
environmental issues, for which the Bush-Quayle anti-regulatory stance will be only a temporary
set-back.
7.  Summary
The period 1991-93 has been relatively uneventful in the farm policy area, excepting
technical corrections and continuing appropriations under the 1990 farm legislation.  Primary
attention has been focused on a series of political and economic developments outside the farm
bill.  The first is the NAFTA agreement, which now awaits a long and difficult process of hearings19
in the House and Senate, with the likelihood of side-agreements on environmental and labor
standards.  The second is the continuing uncertainty over the fate of the Uruguay Round, which
was tied in turn to the oilseeds dispute with the EC.  Third is the growing prominence of conflicts
over trade and the environment, which are likely to dominate trade and environmental policy
discussions in the years ahead.  Finally, the election of Clinton and Gore in November 1992
signaled greater attention to rural economic development, but such attention may be overwhelmed
by other domestic and foreign entanglements.20
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